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Abstract:  
This paper explores the challenges for analysis of urbanization which can arise from 
insufficiently rigorous definition of what is ‘urban’.  Policy makers and investors still 
use the ideas of ‘rural’ versus ‘urban’ and increasingly assume that the pace of 
urbanization in African countries is a measure of positive economic structural change.  
However most urban definitions do not incorporate economic characteristics.  In 
Africa  widely differing urban population thresholds and administrative factors are  
the most common criteria.  The thresholds are often so low that many rural 
settlements may also be defined as ‘urban’ or they may be included on population 
density criteria, meaning the apparent pace of urbanization is inflated unrealistically.  
These issues are exemplifed in this paper through detailed examples drawn from 
Kenya.  It uses a range of sources including official census data and urban data 
published by Africapolis, as well as aerial images of rural and urban settlements in 
Kenya.  It demonstrates how the use of population density criteria has inflated 
Kenyan urban data by the incorporation of large numbers of rural people and explains 
how this can lead to misleading interpretations of local and national urban and 
migration trends. Errors in urban figures can therefore have serious policy 
implications.  It is argued that such errors can be reduced by not relying on a single 
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criterion to define ‘urban’ or by triangulating data on rural and urban settlements with 
other relevant information.  
 
Keywords: Urbanization; Urban definitions; Rural settlements; sub-Saharan Africa; 
Kenya; Africapolis; Migration; Urban policy 
 
Highlights:   
 Urban definitions are an important source of possible confusion when urban 
trends are analysed 
 Used alone, population density criteria can include large rural populations as 
‘urban’  
 Kenya provides many examples of overestimated  urban data due to 
problematic urban definitions  
 Migration between rural and urban sectors may be impossible to track if urban 
areas are drawn so widely that they encompass large numbers of farmers 
 Better policy-relevant analysis is possible when occupational characteristics 
are incorporated into urban definitions  
 
This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, 
commercial, or not-for-profit sectors. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
It  has long been acknowledged by urban researchers that international comparisons 
of rates and levels of urbanization can be misleading because of the significant 
differences in the ways countries define what is urban (see, for example, Cohen 2004; 
Montgomery et al 2004; Mongomery 2008; various works by Satterthwaite, 
frequently updated eg 2006, 2007, 2010; McGranahan and Satterthwaite 2014).   Most 
urban scholars know that urban definitions vary between  countries to a quite startling 
extent, with a threshold of, say, 20,000 people in Nigeria, but only 200 needed in 
Sweden as long as the houses are no more than 200 metres apart (UN 2015).  Given 
their large share of the world’s population,  it is salutary to recognize that changes in 
definitions of ‘urban’ in China have significantly affected the level of urbanization 
recorded there (Shen 2005; Montgomery 2008; Qin and Zhang 2014), and that the 
frequently cited case of India’s exacting criteria for a settlement to be deemed ‘urban’ 
mean it is recorded as far less urbanized than it would be under most other countries’ 
criteria (Satterthwaite  2007; Jones and Corbridge 2010; Indian Institute for Human 
Settlements 2011).  As the world becomes more urban, these issues have attracted 
more attention, perhaps because of the iconic significance of anticipating, and then  
passing, the ‘moment’ when the global population shifted from being mainly ‘rural’ to 
mainly ‘urban’. Identifying regions and countries in Asia and Africa where this has 
occurred, or is projected in the near future to occur, is a common starting point for 
contemporary economic analyses by a wide range of actors, including investment 
consultancies, financial and current affairs media, development agencies, national and 
city governments, NGOs as well as academics (Potts 2016).  On the other hand, many 
 4 
of these economic analyses brush over the difficulties of definitions, if they recognize 
them at all.   
 
The characteristics used to define what is ‘urban’ include settlements’ political and 
administrative functions, population size and population density, economic 
characteristics (in particular the nature of employment),  or some combination of 
these.   These features can all be traced back, conceptually, to the transformations for 
human organization and production made possible by the emergence of agriculture 
around twelve thousand years ago.  Food surpluses allowed the specialization of 
labour away from acquiring food, which in turn facilitated the development of trade, 
the accumulation of surpluses, complex and hierarchical types of state formation, and 
class divisions.  These new types of occupations, trade and political and religious 
authority were all located in and channelled through the new nodes in the human 
landscape which emerged: relatively large, permanent, densely settled and 
heterogeneous (cf Wirth 1969) urban places.  Thus, from the very beginning, labour 
specialization away from natural resource-based work (eg agriculture, forestry, 
fishing) was the crucial enabler and characteristic of urban settlements. 
 
The influence of urbanism’s historical roots can still be seen in some national 
definitions of ‘urban’ used today which are published in the United Nation’s World 
Urbanization Prospects (WUP), the main global urban dataset.  This provides 
numbers on total urban populations as provided by national statistical authorities 
based on country definitions. Administrative criteria are still the most common and 
are used by ‘just over half’ the countries reporting to the UN (Montgomery et al 2004: 
132).   Density and size are frequently used to determine the cut-off between urban 
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settlements and rural areas and settlements.  However, only 30 countries reported in 
the most recent 2014 WUP (United Nations 2015) included economic characteristics, 
despite their significance in the emergence of urbanism.  Of these thirteen were 
Republics within the former USSR which still use its definition based on number of 
inhabitants and a ‘predominance of non-agricultural workers and their families’. In 
Japan one criterion is that ‘60 per cent or more of the population (including their 
dependents) are engaged in manufacturing, trade or other urban type of business’, and 
in India that ‘75 per cent of male working population are engaged in non-agricultural 
pursuits’.  Until 1982 settlements with less than 100,000 in China were only ‘urban’ if 
more than 70 per cent or their populations were ‘registered as nonagricultural’. In 
these countries, where large ‘villages’ or very dense rural settlement patterns have 
long histories, the centrality of ‘urban’ being associated with non-agricultural types of 
work is evident.  It relates to an understanding that ‘urban’ means more than 
settlement size and/or density, and must also mean ‘not rural’ in economic terms.  
 
This latter point is significant in relation to the complex and often contradictory 
realms of interpreting national urban data.  One reason why cross-national 
comparisons of urbanization can be misleading is that urban population thresholds 
may be so low in some countries that settlements which are essentially villages with 
very high proportions of agriculturally-based livelihoods are included. They can also 
be too high so that settlements where most households do not derive any significant 
part of their livelihoods from natural resource-based activities, which might logically 
be regarded as ‘urban’, are excluded.    Population density criteria are also fraught 
with possible difficulties since rural settlement patterns are very variable between and 
within countries and over time.  Factors involved include local agro-ecological 
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conditions: fertile soils and reasonable rainfall (or irrigation) may allow for very high 
rural densities where smallholder agriculture is still the norm as it still is in many 
parts of Asia and Africa.  These may equal or exceed the density required under 
European Union criteria for classification as an ‘urban cluster’ of ‘at least 300 
inhabitants per km2 and a minimum population of 5,000’ (Dijkstra and Poelman, 
2014: 6) which translates into 3 people per hectare over a contiguous area of 17 
square kilometres.1   
 
Montgomery et al (2004: 135) note that problems with cross-national comparisons of 
the level and pace of urbanization are often related to these issues of defining 
‘settlements that might be classified as either rural or urban’ although ‘one can skirt 
the problem by focusing on the urban population that resides in settlements above a 
given size’. This is often true, but problems with defining the ‘urban’ population of 
larger settlements can still affect the measurement of urbanization levels.  Urban 
boundaries can be cast too wide, including people who are still farmers.  Major 
changes can also occur without these being noted in census or other reports.  On the 
other hand, they may not be expanded often enough as urban populations grow and 
residential areas spread beyond existing boundaries, thus excluding many who are 
functionally part of the city in terms of the derivation of their livelihoods.  For very 
large cities, such as Sao Paulo or Cairo, there are further complexities for tracking 
their physical and population growth depending on whether the city’s administrative 
boundaries are used, or the broader concepts of the urban agglomeration, or 
metropolitan area.   These different concepts can yield very different growth rates 
(Montgomery et al 2004).    
                                                 
1 Many farming households in Malawi, for example, have less than a hectare of land. Most of Chiradzulu in 
Malawi, long established as the country’s most densely settled rural district, might be classified as a European 
urban cluster under these criteria with an average population density of 308 and covering 767 square kilometres. 
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Clearly, therefore, defining what is ‘urban’ is complicated and contested and there is 
much scope for misdirected analysis of trends both within and between  countries.  
The view taken here is that ‘urban’ is best understood as a multi-faceted concept.  It 
involves settlement form (size, density), settlement function (as nodes in nested 
landscapes of urban hierarchies which channel local, national and global flows of 
political power, trade and finance), production (with manufacturing industry of 
particular significance for contemporary cities) and employment.  Particularly if urban 
trends are being factored into broader analyses of national economic change,  urban 
employment and economic activities need to be characterised by labour specialisation 
in ways that mainly sets them aside from work in the primary sector, based on natural 
resources.  In broad terms, secondary and tertiary sector activities (whether formal or 
informal) are characteristic of urban places (albeit they can also be found in rural 
settlements eg shopkeepers, teachers, health workers).  
 
The most  obvious primary sector occupation regarded as ‘non-urban’ is farming 
(whether on large- or small-scale farms), as evidenced by urban definitions which 
specify that ‘urban’ employment must be non-agricultural.  Working in forestry or 
fishing are other primary sector occupations which would be considered as non-urban.  
As with all such discussions, there are always caveats; for example, a large fishing 
port from which industrial trawlers  operate would be an urban settlement, but a 
settlement where most fishing is on a small-scale artisanal basis might not.  Mining is 
based on natural resources but it can generate very large urban settlements if large-
scale, permanent deep mining involving major capital investment is involved.  
Obvious African examples are Johannesburg, which has long since its inception 
 8 
developed into one of Africa’s largest agglomerations with a broadly based economy, 
and the Copperbelts in Zambia and the DRC.  On the other hand artisanal mining (eg 
gold panning), which is estimated to employ millions in sub-Saharan Africa (Hilson 
2009) has very variable urbanizing effects: small impermanent mining camps are not 
‘urban’ in any meaningful way but multiplier effects associated with underground 
small mines in Tanzania have encouraged growth in small towns there (Bryceson and 
Jønsson 2010).   The key point is that there are various necessary conditions for a 
settlement to be truly ‘urban’ but none are sufficient alone.  A large, dense settlement 
could be a refugee camp, for example.  A settlement is thus not even necessarily 
urban because the settlement form looks urban; its function and the economic 
characteristics of its population need to be factored in.  Population size alone is not 
necessarily a good guide.  In particular, as will be demonstrated below, when 
choosing factors to determine what is ‘urban’, population density alone is regarded as 
insufficient, and the nature of livelihoods is regarded as necessary. 
 
There are other viewpoints, however.   There is much excellent work on the 
emergence of new types of settlements which defy easy definition and which may 
suggest the reformulation of our terms of engagement with settlement geographies (eg 
Champion and Hugo 2004; Montgomery et al, 2003; Montgomery 2008; McGranahan 
and Satterthwaite 2014; Tacoli 2002, 2006; Tacoli et al 2008). One way of thinking 
about the rural and the urban nowadays, for example, is to treat them in terms of a 
spectrum of settlement types and livelihoods – very rural at one end to very urban at 
the other - with a host of intermediary types of physical locations and associated 
livelihoods, intricately linked by rural-urban movements and flows of goods and 
services.  This is both intellectually respectable and insightful.  It allows us to account 
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for the complexity of settlement types which exists, and promotes the understanding 
and recognition of the importance of rural-urban (and urban-rural) linkages of all 
sorts: economic, social, political, and ecological.  In Africa, for example,  these links 
play an important part in addressing many inherent vulnerabilities in people’s 
livelihoods in both rural and urban areas (Potts 2010; Tacoli 2002). Seasonal patterns 
in employment where people move regularly between  villages, usually during the dry 
season, and urban areas can also be accommodated by a spectrum approach.  It also 
encourages us to recognize the zones of transition between the edge of densely built-
up urban areas and more sparsely settled rural areas where agriculture and other non-
urban landuses predominate.  For example, a current large-scale research project, the 
Rurban Africa project, has been investigating these sorts of zones and the links 
between rural and urban economies and livelihoods over the past few years.  Part of 
its remit is to think about what might be missed in livelihood changes and 
opportunities by confining research arenas to either the ‘urban’ or the ‘rural’ 
(University of Copenhagen 2016).  Discussion of desakota areas beyond city borders 
or urban administrative areas in Asia (Mcgee 2009) has also challenged conventional  
conceptualizations by identifying large, sprawling urban developments which  
incorporate‘rural’ areas and people. The resultant economic landscapes and 
livelihoods are a complex mix of activities, still including some agriculture, but 
intermixed with factories and commercial enterprises and, perhaps, suburban-type 
housing.  However such areas are found adjacent to large cities or embedded in 
conurbations and do ‘not mean that rural activities at a national level have 
disappeared’ (ibid: 2). 
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Such starting points for reformulating our ideas about the rural and the urban are 
rather different from those now current and exciting scholarly attention about the 
concept of planetary urbanization/urbanism.  This would do away with the idea of 
anywhere being ‘rural’, arguing that in the 21st century the world has moved to a point 
where all places and people are bound into a nexus of urban influences and forces 
which are now so determinant that the concept of ‘rural’ has become meaningless 
(Brenner 2013).  Indeed, even the word is set to one aside, in favour of the term ‘non-
urban realm’ (Brenner and Schmid 2014), a realm which is seen as theoretically 
redundant.   This is clearly a more dramatic shift away from conventional ideas about 
human settlement patterns.  For reasons of space it is not possible to engage properly 
with this debate here: that is a different project. Obviously a paper such as this about 
urban and rural definitions is rendered pointless were this view accepted, which it is 
not. For this paper it is worth saying, however,  that it is a viewpoint which perhaps 
seems more feasible to Eurocentric than, say, to Africanist urban scholars, let alone 
those working on rural Africa. The approach has obvious parallels with broader ideas 
about globalization, but the idea that all places are increasingly interconnected and 
affected by events and market forces in distant places does not have to be seen as an 
essentially urban phenomenon (or indeed necessarily a 21st century phenomenon).   
 
Given the problems with defining what is ‘urban’, the new ideas about  a definitional 
shift towards a spectrum approach to the ‘rural’ and the ‘urban’, and the view that 
perhaps everywhere now is ‘urban’, the question arises of whether we should do away 
with these labels and stop trying to define what makes settlements ‘urban’?  The view 
taken here is that academic practitioners in urban and development studies cannot 
abandon them yet.    While in some arenas it may make good sense to embrace a 
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spectrum approach, it has to be clear that those are the terms of reference and it does 
not mean it is useful in all situations. Furthermore, we have to recognize that most of 
those beyond social science academic circles do still work with the general labels of 
rural and urban, and this includes governments,  ministries, statistical offices, all the 
development agencies  and policy makers generally.  So also do economists, and 
many other disciplines involved in development  fields, and so do private sector 
interests like large corporations and investment consultancies.  And wherever  one 
might stand on the limitations of conventional  conceptualizations of what is rural and 
what is urban, we do have to communicate with other groups.  It also works both 
ways: it is important to take note of how powerful actors who can really affect 
people’s livelihoods in Africa use these concepts and what they deduce, or rather 
what they think they can deduce, from them and from the numbers attached to them.  
Because the data that are out there, listed under the terms rural or urban, are given 
significant weight by many decision makers.    
 
There are other sources of misleading urban data in Africa: infrequent or poorly 
conducted censuses, for instance.  These can also lead to the use of inaccurate and 
outdated projections.  These have been analysed elsewhere (Potts 2012a).   The focus 
of this paper is different.  Even if censuses are regularly published and reasonably 
accurate in their enumeration, the evaluation of urban trends still needs to check for 
anomalies arising from the sorts of definitional issues discussed above.  The 
remainder of this paper focuses on the possible impacts of these definitional issues 
with reference to sub-Saharan Africa and Kenya in particular. A particular concern is 
the ways in which the  ‘numbers’ recorded under the labels ‘rural’ and ‘urban’ are 
often understood and used as economic proxies (see Potts 2016).   After a short 
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section outlining the key ways African countries define what is urban and the 
analytical problems these can cause, these  issues are illustrated by a detailed 
discussion of the example of Kenya where there have been problems with published 
urban data relating to urban definitions and also some significant differences in the 
urban data provided by different sources due to different definitions.  It is shown that 
this can lead to very different understandings of what is actually happening on the 
ground, and that some of these interpretations can be misleading for policy makers 
trying to use the data to deduce trends in economic change in either rural or urban 
areas. 
 
2. AFRICAN URBAN DEFINITIONS 
 
Few African countries include any occupational criteria in their definition of urban 
settlements. Of the mainland sub-Saharan African countries, 23 use a size threshold 
only or mainly, sometimes with some administrative centres also included (see Table 
1).  The population needed to be an urban centre  can be less than 2,000 as in Somalia 
or Guinea-Bissau, and eight countries use 2,000 as the threshold.  As already noted, 
Nigeria uses 20,000.  Were this to be reduced to, say, 5,000, and were there to be a 
census there which gave us reasonably reliable urban data, given the size of Nigeria’s 
population, this would undoubtedly suddenly increase the urban share of West 
Africa’s population, and indeed the whole of sub-Saharan Africa’s.  
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Table 1: Urban definitions using size threshold and no occupational characteristics: 
mainland sub-Saharan African countries  
 
<2000 2,000 2,001-4,999 5,000 10,000 >20,000 
Eq. Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Somalia 
CAR 
Kenya 
Angola 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Liberia 
S. Leone 
Uganda 
Gabon 
Niger 
Cameroon 
Ghana 
Madagascar 
Sudan 
Burkina Faso 
Cote d’Ivoire 1 
Mauritania 
Senegal 
Mali  
Nigeria  
Notes: italics: some administrative centres included in addition to settlements over the population 
threshold 
1. Cote d’Ivoire officially includes occupational characteristics for settlements below this 
threshold, see Table 2 
 
Density is also sometimes factored into the mix of urban definitions but, leaving aside 
South Africa which has a swathe of logical urban criteria, there are only six sub-
Saharan African mainland countries (ie excluding island states like Mauritius) which  
include economic or occupational characteristics (see Table 2).  This includes the 
DRC, which has by far the largest population of this group, but as it has not had a 
census since 1984 it is only possible to guess at its urban trends since then.  For the 
others, since occupational data for individual towns (besides the largest sometimes) 
are not published by statistical offices, it is hard to verify how rigorously these 
definitional criteria are applied and the UN have to take the data on trust. 
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Table 2: Urban definitions including settlement characteristics other than population 
only: mainland sub-Saharan African countries 
 
Administrative definition mainly or only: can mean inclusion of very small settlements: Chad, 
Guinea, Malawi, Namibia, Lesotho, Rwanda, Swaziland, Togo 
Occupational characteristics included: Botswana (5,000 + 75% economic activity non-ag); Cote 
d’Ivoire (50% households in non-ag if population 4,000-10,000); DRC (2,000 but predominant 
economic activity must be non-ag); Gambia (5,000 with non-ag occupation for majority of 
inhabitants); Zambia (5,000 and majority of labour force non-ag); Zimbabwe (2,500 and majority of 
employed in non-ag) 
South Africa: range of logical characteristics required 
Tanzania is unique: acknowledged that there is no specific definition apart from centres classified in 
terms of their administrative status. Wards are classified as urban, rural, or mixed (both rural and 
urban) by local officials. Some ‘urban’ areas include mixed wards 
 
 
3. CONFUSING AND COLLIDING DEFINITIONS: THE CASE OF KENYA 
 
The paper now turns to discussing Kenya, a country which illustrates almost every 
possible complication with urban definitions discussed in the earlier sections of this 
paper:  a very low threshold of 2,000 people; sudden and unexplained changes in 
definitions and urban boundaries between censuses; and the evident inclusion of 
millions of rural people as ‘urban’.  It also exhibits another,  almost existential, 
‘urban’ definitional issue where even  some large settlements turn out to have 
significant numbers of primary sector workers,  indicating a lack of   labour 
specialisation even at the top end of the urban hierarchy.  Furthermore,  Africapolis, 
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 the African branch of the French urban research project E-geopolis, which uses 
density criteria alone to define what is urban, has redefined millions of Kenyan people 
enumerated as rural in the 2009 national census as ‘urban’, thereby almost doubling 
the country’s urbanization level.  Let us start with the issues related to official census 
statistics. 
 
First, the Kenyan statistical office has been gradually adding extensive areas beyond 
the perimeter of built-up urban settlements to the ‘urban’ population.  This has been 
happening since 1979 for some towns.   O’Connor (1983: 250) recognized how these 
boundary issues were beginning to confound the analysis of Kenyan urbanization 
based on population numbers alone after the 1979 census and was already suggesting 
the need to include ‘other types of data’ such as wage employment and municipal 
expenditure to assess urban trends in the country.  One reason for these boundary 
changes may be various decentralization initiatives which date back to 1970 in Kenya 
(Becker et al, 2004: 122).  These have been greatly enhanced by a new Constitution in 
2010 which devolves considerable powers and responsibilities to 47 new counties 
(World Bank 2012).  This may have impacts on trends and the measurement of 
urbanization which will only become apparent at the next census (Bassett 2016; 
Munya et al 2015) and cannot be assessed here.  By 1999 the urban definitional issues 
became deeply problematic for meaningful urban analysis; dozens of new and large 
‘urban centres’ suddenly appeared in the census lists of urban settlements and the 
urbanization level jumped.  Once the scale of the issue was recognized, it became 
apparent that most previous analyses of the country’s urbanization patterns since the 
1970s, including comparisons between the rates of growth of Nairobi and other large 
towns as a guide to their relative economic vigour at different times, had been largely 
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meaningless.  For example, there had been discussion of how the intermediate towns 
in the Kenyan hierarchy like Kisumu, Nakuru, Eldoret and Machakos had, apparently,  
suddenly started to grow faster than the capital, Nairobi, in the 1970s and/or 1980s 
with the implication that their economies had become stronger and more attractive to 
migrants.   It also undermined the strength of the conclusions from one analysis by 
economists of Kenyan urban census data up to 1989 which compared those data with 
a demographic cohort shift model which took into account the impact of ‘the 
stagnation of social gains’ in the 1980s.  This concluded that there had been a 
‘dramatic decline’ in the pace of urbanization in Kenya during the 1980s compared to 
the previous decades which was not only consistent with the model but also mirrored 
in the census (Becker et al 1994: 2003).  Had the impact on the functional (ie non-
agricultural) ‘urban’ population figures of the frequently largely rural areas 
incorporated by boundary changes also been factored in, the fall may have been even 
more dramatic.  However this would have depended on the timing for, if an individual 
town’s population was ‘inflated’ in 1979 (rather than 1989), the apparent fall in the 
growth rate would be far too high or may not have occurred at all.  The implications 
for urban economic policies are also made evident in the following quote from a 
chapter on ‘urban challenges’ in a recent Kenyan university textbook: 
 
The implementation of growth centre policy in Kenya has faced many obstacles.  
….. Lack of appropriate data on the urban centres and the hinterlands makes it 
impossible to develop effective selection criteria. Further, haphazard change of 
boundaries of urban centres makes it difficult to establish a stable database. This 
has seen huge parts of the countryside included in the urban boundary that 
seriously exaggerate the sizes of centres.  (Mireri 2007: 112-113)
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Table 3: Kenya’s largest ‘urban centers’ in 2009 ranked by ‘population 
total’ recorded in census tables  
 
Urban Center Core urban: total Peri-urban: total Rural: total Population: total 
Nairobi 3133518 0 0 3133518 
Mombasa 915101 23030 0 938131 
Kisumu 259258 129053 21617 409928 
Nakuru 286411 21579 0 307990 
Eldoret 252061 37319 0 289380 
Kehancha 30109 0 225977 256086 
Ruiru 236961 1897 0 238858 
Malindi 84150 34115 88988 207253 
Naivasha 91993 77149 12824 181966 
Kitui 20419 89149 46328 155896 
Machakos 41917 108124 0 150041 
Thika 136576 341 2936 139853 
Mavoko 110396 26815 2169 139380 
Nyeri 63626 55727 6004 125357 
Vihiga 36398 82298 0 118696 
 
Source: Republic of Kenya, 2009 census  
The 2009 census terms these  additions ‘peri-urban’ areas - another term fraught with 
definitional issues (Simon et al 2004) which will not be dealt with here.  However,  if 
their populations are to be included in urban figures, a reasonable view might be that 
they should be evidently functionally part of the town, with most economically active 
people commuting to work there or employed in non-agricultural occupations.  This is 
not the approach taken in Kenya.  The peri-urban additions are reported in recent 
census publications to be generally rural areas which simply have ‘higher than 
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average population densities’.  It is not therefore clear why they are enumerated as 
part of ‘urban centres’, which is the specific label used in the census reports.  Table 3 
shows Kenya’s ‘largest’ ‘urban centres’ in 2009 ranked according to the total 
populations listed in the census (last column).  This table reproduces the precise labels 
used in the census table which lists 215 ‘urban centers’ (original spelling) from which 
these data have been extracted. 
 
As can be seen, for some ‘urban’ settlements the addition of peri-urban populations 
massively increases the total population.   It is not an issue for Nairobi or Mombasa, 
but  these additions greatly exceed the core urban population in Kitui, Machakos and 
Vihiga, increase Kisumu’s by about  a half, Malindi’s by 40%,  and nearly double 
Naivasha’s and Nyeri’s.  Furthermore, some ‘urban centers’ also have rural 
populations ascribed to them, causing potential further misunderstandings.  The 
differences in Kenya’s pace and level of urbanization  depending on which figures are 
used are significant.  The census reports that 30% of the population are now urban, 
using the combined ‘urban’ and ‘peri-urban’ figures.  However  the ‘core’ urban data 
give a level of 23% and this is used by the WUP which notes the comparability 
problems of including ‘peri-urban’ populations.  Nonetheless, the 30% headline figure 
has had its impact.  In 2011 the World Bank’s Kenyan Economic Profile made 
frequent reference to the apparent massive surge in urbanization as proof of the 
country’s economic vigour and was subtitled: ‘Making the most of Kenya’s 
demographic change and rapid urbanization’ (World Bank 2011).  The preface starts 
with  Johannes Zutte, the World Bank Director for Kenya, stating that ‘Kenya is at the 
beginning of a major demographic transition and is urbanizing rapidly’ (p. ii); later it 
states ‘As elsewhere, urbanization provides many opportunities for economic and 
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social development.   Economic activities located in the cities and towns are on 
average much more productive than those located in rural areas – so when more 
people live and work in the cities, this helps economic growth’   (p. viiii).  Based on 
the misleading census data the report notes approvingly that:  
 
Every year some 250,000 Kenyans are moving to cities and formerly rural areas 
are becoming increasingly urban. Twenty years ago Kenya’s urbanization level 
was only 18 per cent. By 2020, 40 per cent of Kenyans will live in cities and, in 
2033 Kenya will reach another tipping point because half of its population will 
then be living in urban areas…… Today, some 30 per cent of Kenyans already 
live in urban areas …. By 2020 Kenya will have 37 cities of over 100,000 
residents, up from 21 today’ (ibid, p20, 24) 
 
The gist of the report was swiftly appearing in local media (eg East African 2011).  
The ‘tipping point’ seems to have been calculated roughly on the basis that since the 
country appeared to have added ten percentage points to its urbanization level 
between 1999 and 2009, it would continue to do so over the next twenty years.i  But 
of course it had not; the rise in the level was probably between three and four 
percentage points.  Applying the same logic, Kenya will not become half urban for 
another sixty years, in around 2070. Although this is an unequally unsafe projection, 
it serves to illustrate the really significant implications for policy makers of working 
with problematic ‘urban’ numbers.  Indeed Kenya’s current development blueprint, 
Vision 2030, claims that by 2015 the country would be 44.5% urban (Civil Society 
Urban Development Programme n.d.) which has evidently not occurred.   
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So what are these (so called) peri-urban areas like?  Do they have incipient urban 
characteristics?  Careful scrutiny of many such areas via google maps suggests that 
most, although not all, are clearly rural.  The landscapes tend to be characterised by 
strongly rural features.   For example, nearly all the land is occupied by cultivated 
fields and the housing is scattered.  Several illustrations are provided in the 
accompanying interactive map.   They are not areas where urban low-income housing 
has spread beyond town borders for which a sound argument can be made for 
inclusion.    
 
(a) Examples of exaggerated urban  populations in Kenya 
 
Three examples are discussed to illustrate this point and the ways in which Kenya’s 
unusual urban definitions hinder proper analysis of urban and migration trends which 
might assist policy makers. Vihiga municipality appeared for the first time in the 
Kenyan census list of urban places 1999 with  a population of 109,000.  In  2009 the 
census recorded 119,000 people giving an  its average annual growth rate of around 
0.8 per cent, far below the Kenyan average of 3 per cent and what would be expected 
just from natural increase. On the one hand this appears to imply that in the 
intervening period Vihiga ‘urban center’ was very economically unattractive and 
experienced significant net out-migration.  However, as shown in Table 4,  the core 
urban population of the town itself was only about 36,000; the majority enumerated 
were ‘peri-urban’.  Simple observation of the area around the small town via google 
maps shows nothing that would characterise the settlements and landuse there as 
anything but rural (see images of Vihiga town and immediately adjacent rural 
landscape in interactive map).  
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Interactive google map link about here  Images 1 and 2 in powerpoint file 
 
Once this is established, very different economic interpretations are possible.  One 
could be that the area experienced out-migration that was partly rural-urban in 
character (i.e. rural people were leaving Vihiga for other, truly urban, localities).  
Another could be that there had been out-migration of a rural-rural character driven 
by land shortage – this seems to be a strong likelihood as the population density is 
high.  Thus there are three different scenarios which depend on interpretations of 
urban definitions: out-migration from a town; out-migration from rural to urban areas 
beyond the area defined as Vihiga urban centre; or rural-rural migration to land 
outside of the area.  The implications of each scenario for analyses of migration and 
urbanisation and Kenyan economic change are evidently entirely different.   
 
The example of Kehancha,  which lists as Kenya’s sixth largest ‘urban center’ if the 
aggregated total figures were taken at face value (see Table 4), is similar, although 
here the town is associated with a ‘rural’ population of nearly a quarter of a million!  
The ‘town’ and the surrounding areas are shown in  the interactive map  (Image 3 of 
Kehancha town and immediately adjacent rural landscape in powerpoint file). 
Evidently the associated areas and their residents really are deeply rural and their 
appearance at all in a census list for urban centres is a definitional quandary.   
 
The definitional issues have also caused confusion over somewhat larger, more 
established towns.  The combined urban and peri-urban figure for Machakos in 2009 
is 150,000 but, as with the other examples, it is evident that there is no reason to 
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consider most of the population in the vicinity around the town as anything other than 
rural and the core ‘urban’ figure of around 42,000 seems appropriate (see interactive 
map) (Images 4 of Machakos town and Image 5 of landuse and settlements 
immediately adjacent to Machakos town to the east; in powerpoint file).  
Astonishingly, this core figure is only half the ‘urban’ population listed for Machakos 
in the 1979 Kenyan census, indicating how the creeping overestimation of Kenya’s 
urban population has a long history for some settlements.   
 
As with Vihiga, depending on the urban definitions used, the interpretation of what is 
happening in Machakos is completely different. Based on the combined ‘urban’ 
populations in 1999 and 2009, the average annual growth rate was only 0.48% 
suggesting very significant net out-migration.  Using the core urban populations for 
both years, however,  the rate was 3.8%, suggesting more plausibly some net in-
migration, and that it was growing as fast as Nairobi and a little faster than Mombasa.   
 
An example of a much larger Kenyan town with definitional issues relating both to 
over-expanded boundaries and occupational characteristics is Nakuru, with over 
300,000 people according to the 2009 census.  Here massive boundary expansion in 
1979 and 1992 exaggerated its ‘urban’ population growth and farmland and farming 
are commonplace as the central landuse and economic activity in very large parts of 
the city (Foeken and Owuor 2001) (see Figure 1 and images of Nakuru farmland in 
interactive map) (Images 6a and 6b in powerpoint file).  
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                                    Source: google maps 2015 
 
Figure 1 Nakuru urban boundaries and location of aerial images of Nakuru in 
interactive map 
 
Although it is not unusual in African urban centres for some residents to practise 
urban agriculture and/or maintain farms in rural areas (eg Maxwell 1999; Lynch et al 
2012; Simatele et al 2012; Tambwe et al 2011; Mougeot 2005; Potts 2011), the extent 
to which agriculture contributes to livelihoods in Nakuru, given its size, is 
exceptionally high.  A sample survey in 1999 of residents living in the built up parts 
of the town (ie excluding the extensive farmland areas within the urban boundaries) 
found about one third were either cultivating or keeping livestock within the town 
A 
B 
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boundaries, and nearly two-thirds cultivated in rural areas.  For 14% of the surveyed 
residents who were cultivating this was their main economic activity (ibid) which is 
not in line with the occupational changes usually presumed to occur with 
urbanization.  
 
(b) Kenyan urbanization according to Africapolis definitions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Central and East African urbanization levels 1950 and 2010: comparison 
between UN World Urban Prospects and Africapolis figures 
 
The final example of Kenyan urban definitional issues relates to the Africapolis 
project’s  results on Central and East African urbanization.  These are published in a 
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regional report (Harre et al 2010a) and a profile of Kenya (Harre et al 2010b) and give 
an urbanization level for 2010 of 45.3%.  Were this correct it would transform our 
understandings of Kenyan society and economy, since it is double the ‘core’ urban 
level  of 23% which, as noted above, is used in the WUP.  It is even 50% higher than 
the set of census figures which include peri-urban populations. 
 
Africapolis uses population density from remote sensing to establish the extent of 
urban settlements, cross referenced with census and other sources, to provide an 
estimate for a recent year of the urban population, and also provides lists of estimated 
urban populations by decade from 1950, and projected forward from their survey.  
They generally use 10,000 as the urban threshold.  Although their published survey of 
East and Central African urbanization levels for 2010 throws up some anomalies 
when compared, say, to the WUP for 2010 (Figure 2), the differences are less marked 
generally than for West Africa (see Potts 2012b) and will not be further discussed 
here.  The exception is Kenya where definitional issues have had a truly profound 
effect.  
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                                      Source: Odhiambo 2014. 
 
Figure 3: Urban sub-locations in Western Region, Kenya as defined in national census 
2009 
 
While there is some overlap in the definitional imprecision between the Kenyan 
census data and Africapolis, the latter’s approach is more problematic.   Figure 3 
shows sub-locations in the Western Region of Kenya defined as urban by the census; 
a comparison between these areas and the broader brush depiction of most of the 
region as ‘urban’ by Africapolis in Figure 4 illustrates the difference.  The conflict 
with WUP and Kenyan census figures arises because Africapolis uses a simple 
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density criterion (buildings less than 200m apart)  to determine  the physical extent of 
‘urban’ areas.  There is no cross-reference to  
 
 
Source: Harre et al, 2014. 
Figure 4: ‘Urban agglomerations’ in western Kenya based on Africapolis’s density 
criterion 
 
observable livelihood and landuse context on the ground.  This has led to thousands of 
square kilometres of densely settled farmland across a vast swath of western Kenya 
being designated ‘urban’ (see Figure 4),  when much of the region is well known in 
the rural development literature for its characteristically intensive farming and 
associated high rural population densities.
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The areas thus defined by Africapolis are ‘Nyanza conurbation’ with 2.3 million 
‘urban’ people in an area covering 3,028 sq kms and ‘Western conurbation’ with  3.9 
million people in an area of 4,248 sq km (making it more populous than Nairobi).  
While there are some uncontroversially urban settlements in these areas (eg Kisumu, 
one of Kenya’s largest towns with 0.26 million in 2009 is in Nyanza Province),  their 
aggregated populations (using a threshold of 10,000) were  only 0.33 million in 
Western Province and 0.56 million in Nyanza.  More typically the areas depicted as 
‘conurbations’ look like that depicted in the interactive map (see interactive map for 
typical landuse in Nyanza defined as ‘urban’ by Africapolis. 
There are many other examples of overestimation of Kenya’s urban population by 
Africapolis beyond this area in the west of the country.  For instance, a large area 
round Machakos of 229 sq kms is defined as ‘urban’,  with a population of 0.25 
million, nearly six times the size of the Kenyan census figure for the core urban 
population of the town discussed above and depicted in the interactive map.  
 
Rural versus urban settlement patterns? 
 
It is argued that using these Africapolis figures for anything other than a starting point 
for a discussion about Kenya’s unusually dense but scattered rural settlement patterns 
would be bound to mislead.  The graphics in the Africapolis report are labelled with 
the terms ‘urbanization’/’urban’ and do not clarify that there is a departure into 
measuring a more esoteric spectrum of settlement patterns.  As noted in the 
introduction, there is utility in spectrum approaches to the study of urbanization but 
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they need to be cross-referenced with livelihood patterns if they are to contribute to 
debates about socio-economic change.  In relation to this, the Africapolis report on 
Central and East Africa does say: ‘the configurations of the agglomerated areas with 
densified space are essentially agricultural areas, particularly in Kenya, Cameroon, 
Sudan.  Unlike villages and towns based on people working in services, 
administration and industry, the processes in East and Central Africa often involve the 
fragmentation of peasant farms’ and with reference to western Kenya that, ‘In [these] 
societies which maintain norms of scattered settlement, agricultural practices are 
generating in-situ uncontrolled agglomeration processes …. one finds a hybrid form 
of settlement, where agriculture is the main activity, but where the density is too high 
to be rural but too small for a town of this size.  We are therefore dealing with 
conurbations…’ii (Harre et al 2010a: 15).   
 
Although this does alert the reader to the rural nature of many of the landscapes 
labelled ‘urban’, nonetheless some terms are being used in ways very different to how  
they are usually understood by urban practitioners, without explanation.  For example, 
‘maintaining scattered  settlement’ is likened to agglomeration when these two  things 
are usually understood to be completely opposite.   In addition, areas dominated by 
farming (even if densely populated) are depicted as conurbations when this term 
usually refers to towns coalescing.  This loose use of urban terminology makes the 
analysis confusing and potentially misleading. 
 
The issues identified arguably stem from the terms of reference of the e-Geopolis 
project: it is about improving the comparability of the global database on urban 
settlements and populations.  Its terminology and labels are, understandably enough, 
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determined by its agenda. The problems discussed above possibly arise from the 
barriers this sets up for recognizing that some of the phenomena mapped may be 
better understood in terms of  the sub-discipline of rural settlement geography and 
from the anomalies which can occur if using only one criterion for defining urban 
populations, even when observation of landscape and landuse suggests the need for 
further refinement in a particular geographical context. Thus, while it is 
understandable that the analysis is couched in urban terms, what Africapolis has 
mainly identified in this case is differences in rural settlement patterns between parts 
of East and Central Africa, and much of West Africa where there is a greater tendency 
for rural people to live in agglomerated villages.  The Africapolis report even notes 
that the regions’ rural geographies are different, pointing out that  rural West Africa 
has a ‘more even population distribution and residences tend to be grouped together’ 
(Harre et al 2010a:17) but the implications for the conclusions made about Kenya are 
missed.   For this means that Africapolis categorises villages in West Africa, where 
the key occupation is farming, as rural because there are unoccupied spaces between 
them, but defines large parts of Kenya’s rural landscapes as ‘urban’ because houses 
tend to be evenly spaced across the farmland.  Thus the regional differences are due to 
a definitional conundrum whereby, if the rural people of western Kenya tended to live 
in agglomerated villages, although the population density would not change, they 
would have been defined as rural.  In other words, at high rural population densities, 
the more scattered the population is, the more urban they are according to the 
Africapolis methodology. A more telling example of the importance of definitions for 
interpreting African urban and rural trends is hard to find. 
 
A final example of how the problematic definitions adopted by Africapolis in its 
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analysis of Kenya can obscure understandings of urban and economic trends relates to 
the projections the project provides for Kenyan urbanization.  National urban policies 
often draw on population projections so that planners can anticipate where population 
change will occur.   The geographies of migration flows (both rural-urban and urban-
rural) are necessary elements in such projections.  Such flows are key indicators of the 
geography of economic opportunities and changing patterns of demand for services, 
inter alia.  Their trends and scale are therefore useful information for policy makers.  
However,  because the Africapolis report has defined so many densely settled rural 
areas as urban, even when they were very far from the observable boundaries of built-
up areas of real towns, subsequent out-migration from such areas into towns and cities 
becomes ‘hidden’.  This is because migration flows are only measured across the 
administrative or settlement boundaries used by censuses or other surveys.  Any 
movement within a defined spatial unit, such as an urban settlement, will not be 
picked up by migration questions in such surveys.  Very extended urban boundaries 
which embrace large rural areas with strongly agricultural populations mean that 
mobility within that spatial unit with important policy and economic implications – 
that is migration between functionally rural and functionally urban areas – is missed. 
As demonstrated in this paper this is already occurring due to the current Kenyan 
census approach.  The same issues arise with Africapolis, but further exaggerated.  
Africapolis projects that over the current decade, 2010 to 2020, Kenya’s urbanization 
level will rise by less than one percentage point to 46.2%. This would imply that net 
migration between rural and urban Kenya had severely contracted with all that this 
would imply in terms of very slow changes in national employment and production 
structures.  Although such slow urbanization in African countries is not 
unprecedented (Potts 2012a), it seems rather unlikely in Kenya’s case.  Yet the next 
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census will probably not be able to provide clear answers about these useful planning 
indices either because of the national definitional issues.  The problem is that, 
whatever is actually occurring in terms of net migration flows and urban trends within 
Kenya is becoming increasingly difficult to measure and analyse because so many 
rural people have now been conflated into the ‘urban’ population.  
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper has argued that analysis of urban trends requires careful consideration of 
the definitions and labels relating to ‘urban’ and ‘rural’ employed by the datasets 
used.  It is widely recognized that comparative analysis of urbanization needs to be 
wary of differences in national definitions.  If this is addressed, often it is achieved by 
using standardized urban population thresholds (eg 10,000 or 20,000).  However,  as 
has been shown in the case study of Kenya, there are other potential sources of 
confusion.  These can make analysing urban trends within the same country, let alone 
comparisons, very challenging.  Changes in definitions between censuses can render 
analysis meaningless.  Questionable treatments of in-situ urbanization can also 
mislead.   
 
It is important to note that it is recognized that in-situ urbanization, whereby 
settlements previously defined as rural are re-defined as urban without necessarily 
increasing in population size,  can be an important element in urbanization.  It can 
occur where economic activities of populations living in agglomerated settlements 
gradually shift towards specialised occupations which differentiate them from 
agriculturally-based livelihoods or  larger urban settlements expand to incorporate 
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surrounding villages (eg see Zhu 2002, on China; Selolwane 2006, on Botswana).   
However, relabelling as ‘in-situ urbanization’ landscapes and populations which are 
functionally rural, where natural resource based landuses and livelihoods 
predominate, on the basis of population density alone is problematic.  It makes the 
assessment of the geography of structural economic change extremely difficult.  This 
paper has shown how this is one process that has made the analysis of urbanization in 
Kenya for some decades both confused and confusing.  First, Kenyan censuses 
ascribe significant numbers of rural people to many ‘urban’ settlements .  Second, the 
Africapolis report on Kenyan urbanization takes this process even further and re-
defines millions more rural Kenyans as ‘urban’, making specific reference to the term 
‘in situ urbanization’ in a way which, as explained, is regarded as highly questionable.     
 
Promoting the use of logical urban definitions which users of urban data understand 
and recognize is not an essentialist argument.  It is not a call for the development of 
one set of universally accepted urban criteria. Not only is that unachievable, given the 
vast range of national definitions in use, but it would undoubtedly cause another set of 
problems since there really are important localized factors and contexts which 
determine what is sensibly definable as ‘urban’.  Instead the analysis in this paper is 
pointing to two  issues with implications for urban and economic policies. One is that 
statisticians – those who ‘make’ the urban (or rural) data – can improve things for end 
users if they explain as clearly as possible how and why ‘urban’ settlements and 
populations are defined and, crucially, what the definitions mean for how the data can 
be used and what can and cannot be deduced from it.  For example, if density criteria 
alone are used to define some areas, as in Kenya, then users might be reminded that 
this may not mean that there have been any structural economic changes in those 
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areas which conform with the norms of urbanization as an economic process.  The 
second issue is that users of the statistics need to check that the ‘numbers’ conform to 
their expectations of what  ‘urban’implies.  For a political scientist, for example, 
common political rationales for the expansion of urban boundaries to ‘capture’ new 
voters or increase the population weight of the urban unit for allocations of national 
resources may be precisely the objects of study.  However, for an economic 
geographer or investment planner there may be an expectation that the data indicate 
something about economies and employment structures.   Ideally other data on, for 
example, infrastructure and services in individual settlements would be factored in to 
urban definitions or available for users to cross-reference with population numbers.  
There are strong limitations imposed, however, on African national statistical offices 
by their limited resources (Jerven 2013) and, beyond population numbers, publicly 
available socio-economic data on individual towns, apart sometimes from the capital 
city and one or two others, are not easily found.  Some data for ‘all urban’ areas are 
sometimes published but these are of little guidance for intra-urban assessments.  
Nonetheless most African censuses do collect data on a range of household 
characteristics such as housing type and education which are often published for 
provincial and district level.  If these were disaggregated by individual urban 
settlement  also, our understandings of urbanization would be much improved. The 
same is true of labour force surveys which are beginning to be more regularly 
collected in a few countries, such as Ghana, but again the data are not disaggregated 
by individual towns.  However, even if ‘economic’ users find that ‘urban’ and ‘rural’ 
definitions do not, for example, account for ‘what people do’so that associated 
datasets may be problematic for assessing economic structural change, as in Kenya, 
then at least they are aware that the data should be used with caution.  This might also 
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suggest the need to triangulate national urban datasets with other relevant data, such 
as labour force surveys, as a cross check. The easy availability of remotely sensed 
imagery can be helpful here although, as shown with reference to Africapolis’s report 
on Kenyan urbanization,  formulaic use can be problematic.  Familiarity with the 
regional context of the countries in question can also make a significant difference to 
the validity of urban analyses.   
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i The report includes a table of the largest ‘towns’ which is based on the ‘urban’ and ‘peri-urban’ 
figures for 2009, with projections for each to 2020.  This applies an annual growth rate of 4.7% to 
every town, regardless of whether the populations are mainly ‘urban’ or  predominantly ‘peri-urban’, 
which is evidently problematic. 
ii Translated from French. 
